






Supply Chain Design for High Quality Products: Economic Concepts 













Paper prepared for presentation at the 13
th International Farm Management Congress, 









Copyright 2002 by Robert P. King.  All rights reserved.  Readers may make verbatim 
copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this 







 SUPPLY CHAIN DESIGN FOR HIGH QUALITY PRODUCTS:
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS AND EXAMPLES
FROM THE UNITED STATES
Robert P. King
Department of Applied Economics
University of Minnesota
St. Paul, MN   USA
ABSTRACT
The food system is undergoing significant structural change at local, national,
and international levels. As the food system evolves, some segments along the
chain between producers and consumers are disappearing.  Others are being
transformed.  Supply chain concepts are useful for identifying and assessing
alternative designs for the reconfiguration of food product production
systems. Changes in the food system will require farm managers to adopt new
ways of thinking and new perspectives on collaboration with trading partners.
 They also will require farm management economists to draw on a wider set of
economic theories and concepts than we have in the past.  This paper begins
with brief descriptions of emerging supply chains for high quality food
products in the U.S.: (i) a branded product chain, (ii) a genetics-based chain,
and (iii) a production-practice based chain.  These illustrate the variety of
emerging supply chain structures and the challenges firms face in designing
new supply chains.  The next section presents an overview of key elements of
four theoretical frameworks that are helpful in supply chain analysis and
design:  (i) transaction cost economics, (ii) agency theory, (iii) property rights
theory, and (iv) the resource based view of the firm.  Concepts from these
theories are used to explain structural differences in the three illustrative
cases.  Looking to the future, key challenges include improving system-wide
efficiency through information sharing and logistics management, promoting
transparency and trust among trading partners, and designing incentive
systems that ensure an equitable distribution of costs and returns.
The food system is undergoing significant structural change at local,
national, and international levels.  New products, new business practices, and
new relationships among trading partners are noteworthy indicators of this
change.  Biotechnology, information technology, and globalization are among
the most important forces driving it.
The U.S. food system experienced an equally dramatic transformation in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Business historian Alfred D.
Chandler (1977) argues in The Visible Hand that the revolution in
transportation and communications initiated by the development of railroad,
telegraph, and telephone systems led to radically new production and
distribution systems in many sectors of the U.S. economy, including the foodsector.  Mass production and distribution systems emerged in tandem as new
manufacturing and logistics systems were developed.  Food processing and
packaging technologies were the basis for the development of national and
international brands and for the emergence of food retailing chains. 
Concurrently, linkages between farmers and consumers weakened, since it
was processing and distribution that gave food products their brand identity,
and farmers= share of the consumer=s food dollar began a decline that has
continued to the present.
At the start of the twenty-first century, concerns about food safety and
quality are motivating consumers to seek closer connections with farmers.  At
the same time, biotechnology and information technology make it easier for
food manufacturers and retailers to substitute primary product attributes for
processing of agricultural commodities.  Locally, these changes are fostering
an increase in direct marketing through on-farm shops, roadside stands, and
farmers markets.  Regionally and nationally, there is rapidly growing demand
for natural and organic food products and for Afunctional foods@ with special
health attributes.  Often, these new branded foods based on agricultural
product attributes are offered by the same food processing firms that played a
key role in the Aold@ food system.  Internationally, concerns over genetically
modified organisms and BSE are having profound impacts on trade of food
and feed grains and livestock products.  At the same time, global markets for
products with a strong local identity B e.g., Protected Denomination of Origin
products from the EU B are expanding rapidly, as is international trade of high
quality fruits and vegetables to ensure a year-round supply.
As the food system evolves, some segments along the chain between
producers and consumers are disappearing.  Others are being transformed. 
Supply chain concepts are useful for identifying and assessing alternative
designs for the reconfiguration of food product production systems.  A supply
chain is a linked set of value creating activities encompassing product design,
input procurement, primary production and processing, marketing,
distribution, and service.  Supply chain thinking emphasizes the importance of
viewing a chain as a unified system.  Key concerns include questions about
how to achieve: efficient investment and operating decisions across allsegments, equitable distribution of returns and costs among trading partners,
product quality and safety, and innovation.
Changes in the food system will require farm managers to adopt new ways
of thinking and new perspectives on collaboration with trading partners.  They
also will require farm management economists to draw on a wider set of
economic theories and concepts than we have in the past.  The ultimate goal in
this paper is to provide an overview of economic tools for expanding the scope
of analyses of farm management problems in a supply chain context.  The
paper begins, however, with brief descriptions of emerging supply chains for
high quality food products in the U.S., since the usefulness of new concepts is
best assessed in terms of their ability to explain real phenomena.  The second
section of the paper introduces key elements of four theoretical frameworks
that are helpful in designing an evaluating such supply chains: (i) transaction
cost economics, (ii) agency theory, (iii) property rights theory, and (iv) the
resource based view of the firm.  The concluding section looks ahead to some
of the challenges and opportunities farmers will face in adapting to change in
the food system.
EXAMPLES OF EMERGING FOOD PRODUCT SUPPLY CHAINS IN
THE U.S.
There is great diversity in the structure of emerging supply chains for food
products.  In this section, we briefly describe supply chains for (1) a branded
product, (2) a genetics-based product, and (3) a production practice-based
product.
1  One of the key drivers of supply chain structure is the locus and
strength of chain leadership, and leadership rests in a different segment for
each of these chains.  This affects overall chain structure, product and
information flows, and the distribution of returns and costs.
A Branded Product Chain B Sourcing Wheat for Wheaties Breakfast
Cereal
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Wheaties is a popular breakfast cereal made from whole wheat.  It has
been manufactured by General Mills since 1921.  Until recently, General Mills
procured wheat for Wheaties in traditional commodity markets.  However,
company researchers discovered that cereal flakes made from particular wheat
varieties are more curly, crispy, and resistant to breakage than flakes madewith other varieties, and cereal made with the special varieties is consistently
preferred in consumer taste tests.  As a result, General Mills decided to use
only these special varieties, and the company has developed a supply chain to
ensure an adequate supply of identity preserved wheat to its manufacturing
plants.
The Wheaties supply chain has five technologically separable segments
prior to the cereal plant: seed production, seed distribution, farm production,
assembly and storage, and transportation.  General Mills, the chain leader,
controls all of these except farm production through elevators it owns in
Idaho.  Through these elevators, General Mills contracts with farmers for
production of identity preserved wheat, paying premiums ranging from $0.05
to $0.25 per bushel.  It is difficult to quantify the added value created through
identity preservation, because General Mills does not even convey information
about the use of special wheat varieties to consumers, but nearly all the
benefits and costs for the system accrue to General Mills.  With the tight
control afforded by vertical integration, General Mills manages information
flows and the logistics of product flows to manufacturing plants.  The system
also helps minimize monitoring and testing costs, since there is little incentive
for elevators to misrepresent product quality when they are wholly owned
subsidiaries.  Finally, the high degree of vertical integration both helps and
hinders innovation.  On the one hand, General Mills can quickly change to a
new variety and can use the system to source identity preserved grains for
other branded products.  On the other hand, the investment in elevators in a
single region make it more difficult to shift production elsewhere.
A Genetics-Based Chain B LoSatSoy
TM Oil
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Over the past decade seed companies have placed increased emphasis on
developing varieties with traits well suited for special purposes.  The low
palmitic-acid soybean, developed at Iowa State University using traditional
breeding methods and commercialized by Pioneer Hi-Bred International under
a license agreement is an example of such a variety.  LoSatSoy
TM cooking oil
produced with low saturate soybeans has a low level of saturated fat,
comparable to that in canola oil (Iowa State University Office of
Biotechnology, 1997). LoSatSoy
TM oil sells for a retail price premium relativeto standard soybean oil that translates into a premium of approximately $2.21
per bushel of soybeans.
The DuPont Company, which owns Pioneer Hi-Bred, faces two difficult
challenges in commercializing varieties like low saturate soybeans.  First,
varieties with special traits have added value only if varietal integrity is
maintained during farm production and as the product moves from the farm to
the manufacturer.  Second, while seed companies operate at the upstream end
of the supply chain, the added value for these products is not realized until
they reach downstream users.  Both identity preservation and value capture are
difficult when ownership changes hands several times as they move through
the supply chain.  Working through Pioneer Hi-Bred and two other
subsidiaries B Optimum Quality Grains, L.L.C. (OQG) and Protein
Technologies International (PTI) B DuPont has developed an innovative
supply chain that helps address these challenges.
OQG coordinates the upstream segments of the chain (seed production and
distribution through farm production and assembly and transportation) through
an Internet-based contracting system called OSCAR
TM that allows farmers to
identify nearby elevators that are offering contracts for identity preserved
products.  Low saturate soybean seeds are only sold to farmers who have
contracted through this system.  The contracts stipulate production practices
that ensure varietal integrity and require farmers to deliver all their production
to the contracting elevator.  In return, farmers receive a premium of $0.25 over
the local price for commodity soybeans.  Contracting elevators, not OQG,
purchase the low saturate soybeans from the farmers.  OQG reimburses the
elevators for the identity preservation premium paid to farmers, pays the
elevators a small fee for segregating the low saturate soybeans during storage,
and directs elevators to ship the identity preserved soybeans to a crushing
plant when they are needed.
PTI coordinates the downstream segments of the chain (crushing, refining,
and distribution to retail channels) and works with retail customers to promote
demand for LoSatSoy
TM oil.  PTI contracts with a crushing plant and a
refining plant to maintain identity preservation of the product as it is
processed, but PTI never actually owns the soybeans or the oil derived fromthem.  Rather, PTI pays small quantity-based premiums to the crusher and
refiner and then charges a royalty fee to the refiner for each unit of
LoSatSoy
TM oil it sells.
The LoSatSoy
TM oil supply chain brings many independent actors together
in a well integrated identity preserved system.  Working through its
subsidiaries, DuPont gathers valuable information on end-user demand,
projected seed requirements for the next growing season, and the spatial
pattern of production and stocks.  At the same time, DuPont captures a large
share of the added value in the chain by effectively negotiating premiums
received by farmers, elevator and crusher handling fees, and royalties received
by the refiner, while never actually taking title to the low saturate soybeans or
the products derived from them.  The chain is highly adaptable, since the
contracting elevators, crusher, and refiner can be changed from year to year. 
Also, this same basic structure has been used by DuPont to create identity
preserved supply chains for other genetics-based products.
A Production-Practice Based Chain B Whole Farm Cooperative
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Small farmers who use sustainable practices use a variety of approaches to
develop stronger direct linkages to consumers and capture a greater share of
food expenditures.  These include direct marketing through farmers markets or
roadside stands and community supported agriculture arrangements in which
consumers pay a significant advance fee in order to receive weekly deliveries
of in-season produce through the growing season.  One of the most interesting
and unique approaches is that developed by Whole Farm Cooperative, a group
of sustainable producers based in Long Prairie, a small town in western
Minnesota.
This group formed in 1996, with the original objective of selling meat
products to local colleges for dormitory food service operations.  After months
of trying to arrange this, however, they realized that institutions= contracts
with large food service firms would not allow significant purchases of food
products from outside vendors.  With their market opportunity gone, one
member of the group began sending a product price list by email to potential
customers in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area.  The response was
favorable, and cooperative members now make several trips to the city eachmonth to deliver product to Adrop points@ at churches or customer homes
where customers pick up their orders.  The cooperative also sells through
several small independent grocery stores that have agreed to carry their
products.
Whole Farm Cooperative offers a wide range of meat, dairy, produce,
bakery, and craft items under a common label.  Committees have developed
minimum production standards for each product group, but the producer=s
name is also stamped on most product labels.  Customers can go to the
cooperative=s web site
(http://www.alexweb.net/wholefarmcoop/index.html) to read farmer
profiles, and customers can request that their orders be filled with products
from specified producers.  Sales grew from approximately $25,000 in 1998 to
over $200,000 in 1999, and there was continued growth in 2000.  In addition
to serving customers in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, the cooperative is
increasing its sales to consumers in the Long Prairie area.
The supply chain developed by the Whole Farm Cooperative uses
information technology and personal contact to establish a strong, direct link
between producers and consumers.  By working together, producers realize
economies of size in processing and storage, product promotion, order taking,
and transportation.  They have reached a significant customer base without
going through chain intermediaries.  Now they have grown to the point where
they will be hiring a manager, and they are striving for continuous
improvement in product quality and consistency.
CONCEPTUAL TOOLS FOR SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS AND
DESIGN
Production economics has been the foundation for farm management
research and teaching since the late 1940s (Jensen, 1977).  The focus is on
technical and allocative efficiency for firms that operate in perfectly
competitive markets.  As we look toward the emerging food system, with
greater emphasis placed on coordination across firm boundaries in the
production and distribution of more differentiated products, we need to draw
on a broader set of economic concepts and theories.  The rapidly growing
literature on the economics of business organization is especially relevant forfarm management in this new setting.  In this section, we present brief
overviews of four important theoretical frameworks from this literature:
transaction cost economics, agency theory, property rights theory, and the
resource based theory of the firm.
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Transaction Cost Economics
Transaction cost economics (TCE) draws on the fundamental insight from
Coase (1937) that there are costs associated with using markets to coordinate
linkages between technologically separable segments of a production process.
 More fully developed by Williamson (1975, 1990), TCE focuses on the
structure of economic relationships governing these linkages, ranging along a
continuum for competitive markets to vertical integration.  Factors affecting
the choice of governance structures include the frequency of transactions, the
level of uncertainty inherent in them, and the presence of asset specificity. 
Asset specificity refers to the fact that investments in specialized physical or
human capital or choice of a location for assets that are difficult to move may
be necessary to establish an efficient linkage between segments but may also
fundamentally alter bargaining power between segments if they are controlled
by separate firms.
TCE helps explain some of the differences in the three supply chains
described earlier.  For example, in procuring wheat for Wheaties, General
Mills reduces transaction costs by having vertically integrated upstream to
own grain elevators.  Information about projected annual needs and short term
shipments to manufacturing plants can flow quickly and confidentially, and
the need for laboratory checks to ensure varietal integrity is minimized.  The
design of the LoSatSoy
TM chain is novel because it allows DuPont=s
subsidiaries to control product and information flows across several firm
boundaries without ever actually owning the product or making major
investments in location and product specific assets for grain assembly, storage,
and processing.  Furthermore, this chain allows participants to use the highly
efficient price discovery and risk management tools of commodity markets as
the low saturate soybeans move through the chain.  To gain these benefits,
though, DuPont incurs significant costs for testing product integrity each time
ownership changes and has made significant investments in the transactiontechnology embodied in the OSCAR
TM system.  Finally, Whole Farm
Cooperative uses the Internet as a tool for linking directly to a large number of
geographically dispersed customers, bypassing traditional wholesale and retail
systems that usually intermediate between farmers and consumers.  By
integrating horizontally in a cooperative, individual farmers share the fixed
costs of establishing this system.  In is also important to note that the members
of Whole Farm Cooperative incur significant costs by integrating downstream
into retail distribution and marketing.  They cannot achieve the efficiency of
large scale wholesale and retail operations in moving products to consumers.
TCE provides several useful insights for those considering the design of or
affiliation with a new supply chains.  First, it encourages the development of
business relationships and information systems that help minimize transaction
costs.  Second, it encourages explicit consideration of tradeoffs between
maximizing technical efficiency and minimizing transaction costs across the
entire supply chain.  Finally, TCE encourages chain participants to think
through the implications of fundamental changes in bargaining power that
occur after asset specific investments are made.
Agency Theory
Agency theory focuses on situations where two or more individuals with
conflicting objectives contribute to a production process.  Normative
principal-agent models (Ross, 1973); Stiglitz, 1974, 1975; Holmström, 1979)
are concerned with the design of incentive systems that help align the interests
of employees (agent) with employers (principals) when it is difficult to
monitor and measure effort.  Team production adds to the complexity of
agency relationships (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).  Optimal incentive
schemes usually involve some monitoring of output or effort and a link
between measurable performance and the agent=s compensation.  When there
is uncertainty in the production process, linking pay to performance can shift
risk to the agent, leading to risk averse behavior that may not be in the best
interest of the principal.
Insights from agency theory are clearly relevant to the problem of food
product supply chain design and management, since the supply chain leader
works with employees and/or independent trading partners to deliver a highquality product as efficiently as possible.  For example, the farmer contracts
used in both the Wheaties and LoSatSoy
TM supply chains call for sale of all
production from a specified number of acres at the current commodity price
plus a pre-set premium.  This allows the supply chain leader to monitor
production during the growing season and provides strong incentives for all
production to be delivered rather than sold outside the chain.  Both General
Mills and DuPont also incur costs for laboratory testing to guarantee the
varietal integrity of the product farmers deliver.  Agency theory can also help
explain the monitoring and compensation schemes used in downstream
segments of both these chains.
Agency relationships are largely eliminated under the direct marketing
approach used by Whole Farm Cooperative, but agency theory does help
explain responses to team production problems arising from the fact that a
large number of independently produced products are marketed under a single
brand.  Product committees enforce quality standards by not allowing
substandard items to be sold through the cooperative, and the fact that
customers can request a particular farmer as their supplier for a product
provides added incentives for quality assurance.  Finally, as the cooperative
grows and uses a hired employee to manage operations and promote the
Whole Farm Cooperative brand, new agency problems will emerge.
Agency models do not help explain who is or should be chain leader, since
the identity of the principal is almost always established by prior assumption. 
Similarly, these models usually assume technology and institutions are fixed
and so are not very useful for explaining adaptability to changing technology
and market conditions.  Regarding distribution of costs and returns across the
chain, static agency models emphasize the adversarial relationship between
principals and agents and predict that principals will drive compensation down
as close to the reservation wage as possible, but reputation becomes a factor in
dynamic models and so they can shed some insights on the importance of
stable trading partner relationships and broader sharing of net benefits.
Property Rights Theory
Property rights theory is concerned with the question of who should own
assets in settings where two or more technologically separable activities arevertically linked and it is not possible to write and enforce contracts that
specify the actions of all parties.  This is similar to the stylized setting for
agency theory, but property rights theory focuses on system-wide impacts of
alternative asset ownership rather than on the design of incentive systems.  In
this respect, these two frameworks are complementary.  Oliver Hart=s (1995)
recent book, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, provides a good
introduction to property rights theory.  Earlier papers by Grossman and Hart
(1986) and by Hart and Moore (1990) develop key ideas underlying this
framework.  Each focuses attention on tradeoffs associated with concentrating
ownership (defined as residual rights of control) of relation-specific assets. 
The following are some general propositions derived by Hart and Moore
(1990, pp. 1131-1139) and by Hart (1995, pp. 44-55):
￿  An agent should own an asset if this ownership does not affect
investment incentives of other agents.
￿  An agent should own an asset if it has value only when she owns it.
￿  If a group of agents are needed to make investment in an asset
productive, control should be governed by majority voting among the
group.
￿  When assets are economically independent, independent ownership is
better than integration.
￿  When assets are highly complementary, some form of integration is
better than independent ownership.
These propositions help explain the case examples.  In the LoSatSoy
TM
chain, DuPont owns the firms that are critical for varietal development and for
the coordination of product and information flows needed to protect its
intellectual property rights downstream through the chain.  Given the design
of this chain, farmland, grain elevators, and processing plants are
economically independent and so are independently owned.  In contrast,
General Mills views its elevator system as complementary to its
manufacturing plants (not only for Wheaties but also for other products) and
so there is a high degree of vertical integration in its chain.  Finally, the key
asset of Whole Farm Cooperative is its brand, which is identified with small
farmers using sustainable production practices and selling directly toconsumers.  This brand identity can be achieved only by a group, and the
cooperative form they have adopted calls for democratic control of this asset.
The primary contribution of property rights theory is in providing insights
on who should be the chain leader.  Most models in this framework have a
simplistic treatment of distributional issues, quality assurance mechanisms,
and responsiveness to technological and institutional change.
The Resource Based View of the Firm
The resource based view of the firm (RBV) focuses on acquisition and
effective use of intangible assets B e.g., knowledge, unique skills, systems for
learning, and brand image B as well as the tangible assets that emphasized in
other theories.  The Theory of the Growth of the Firm by Edith Penrose (1959)
develops many key concepts in this framework.  Prahalad and Hamel(1990),
Mahoney (1992), and Langlois and Robertson (1995) provide more recent
overviews.  Still more recently, Gulati, Nohria, and Zaheer (2000) have
extended the resource based perspective to networks, arguing that unique,
inimitable knowledge and skills may reside in a network of firms, such as a
supply chain, and may be a source of competitive advantage for the entire
network or an impediment to systemic change that requires actions by several
independent firms.
Work under the RBV is less formal analytically and less unified in key
assumptions and methods than research associated with the other theories
discussed here.  However, the need to develop and exploit unique resources
that are not easily imitated and the importance of organizational learning are
common themes in the RBV literature B themes that shed light on the structure
of at least two of the three supply chains described earlier.  DuPont has
structured the LoSatSoy
TM oil supply chain to protect and enhance the value of
its intellectual property.  At the same time, this chain helps DuPont learn
about market conditions in each segment of the supply chain, extending all the
way to the retail level. The much less complex supply chain developed by
Whole Farm Cooperative helps individual producers establish strong links
with their consumers without incurring the high costs associated with other
forms of direct marketing.  This is accomplished through farmer profiles on
the cooperative=s web site and farmer names on each product sold.  The use ofelectronic communication also makes it easy for the cooperative to receive
comments and suggestions from consumers.  Finally, the product committees
established within the cooperative strengthen positive network externalities
and facilitate knowledge transfer among cooperative members.
A key contribution of the RBV is the insight that a supply chain can be
viewed as a unique collection of resources that can give its participants
sustainable competitive advantage.  Often cooperation among trading partners
within the chain or tight control by the chain leader is needed to fully exploit
exiting resources or respond to new opportunities.  The RBV helps explain
efficiency gains from effective supply chain design and helps analysts and
participants identify forces that f or inhibit innovation.
Concluding Remarks on Theoretical Frameworks
Each of the theoretical frameworks described in this section helps explain
existing supply chain structures and provides insights for designing new
chains.  These theories start with different assumptions, emphasize different
aspects of supply chain design and management, and sometimes yield
conflicting predictions and prescriptions. However, they are also highly
complementary, and it is valuable to approach supply chain problems from
multiple perspectives.  Finally, it is important to recognize that our knowledge
of how to apply these theories in practical settings is still limited, though
applied work is progressing rapidly.
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR FARM MANAGERS
Changes in the food system are making quality attributes based on farm
production more important as food products move downstream toward
consumers.  In addition to focusing on the efficiency of their own operations,
farm managers need to give increased attention to market-based and
contractual relationships with trading partners and consumers.  Theories
presented here can be useful tools for analyzing and designing these
relationships.
Looking to the future, all participants in the food system will need to
continually emphasize improvements in system-wide efficiency and quality
assurance.  Improvements in product design, logistics, and information sharing
will be key to these improvements, though efficiency gains in specificsegments will also be important.  Designing supply chain structures that
promote transparency and trust among trading partners will be another
important challenge.  Here farmers can learn much from efforts at the retail
end of the supply chain (King, 1998).  Finally, designing incentive systems
that ensure equitable distribution of returns and costs among supply chain
participants is likely to be one of the most difficult challenges.  The renewed
emphasis on quality attributes based on farm production creates an
opportunity for farmers to regain a larger share of the consumer food dollar,
but increasing concentration and market power in other segments may make it
difficult to exploit this opportunity.
ENDNOTES
1 See Venturini and King (in press) for descriptions of several other European
food product supply chains.
2 This supply chain description is based on presentations by and personal
communication with Ronald D. Olson, Vice President Grain Operations,
General Mills.  It is a synopsis of a more complete description in Venturini
and King (in press).
3 This supply chain description is based on personal communication with
Robert E. Kennedy at Optimum Quality Grain and on information from Web
sites for Optimum Quality Grains, L.L.C. (http://oscar.dupontsg.com/) and
Protein Technologies International (http://www.protein.com).  This is a
synopsis of a more complete description in King (2000, pp. 2-6).
4 See King and DiGiacomo (2000, pp. 75-79) for a more complete description
of the Whole Farm Cooperative=s history and operations.
5 Much of this section summaries a more extensive overview of these theories
in Venturini and King (in press).  I gratefully acknowledge Luciano
Venturini=s contributions to my knowledge of these theories.REFERENCES
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